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H SUPREMe: COURT
BRIEF:

IN THE

Supreme Court
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH OOP,PER OOMP ANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

STEPHEN HA'Y.S ESTATE, Inc., a
corporation of Utah, JULIA HAYS
HOGE, STEPHEN J. HAYS,
LAWRENCE J. HA Y:S, MRS
LOU GOREY, MRS. E<THEL V.
REILLEY and MARY LOUISE
O'DONNELL,

1

No. 5302

Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANTS' ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING.
In this reply we have no intention of devoting much
space to comment upon defendants' discussion by their
1

answer to petition for rehearing that a reasonable
framiliari,ty ·with the record, the issues and the bniefs
filed, will disclose as obvious bombast. If after all that
has been written and said in this case this Court can
take stock in such assertion, it would be a waste of time
for us to be led into an analysis of the several statements that compose that answer. Suffice it to say that
we have intended no insult to this Court, and of course
have not insulted this Court, nor has there been the
least change in a single theory we originally entertained
in this suit. Our course has been consistent from its
inception. We founded our right to condemn upon
many theories, none of which either were or are inconsistent. We have argued them all earnestly and
sincerely, and we stand upon them all today as we did
when the complaint was filed. There could be no more
convincing assurance of our respect for this court than
the effort we are now making.
The nature of a suit to condemn, its future aspects
only, the distinctions between such a suit and a suit to
quiet title, the legal effect of the order to occupy, the
legal effect of the grant of an easement for the conveyance of copper solutions thereafter to be produced,
the eff~ct accordingly of the judgment in conde:rnn:ation
and its relation ba<lk to the order to occupy, the nature
of these cop.per solutions, the artificial manner of their
production, their characteristics as a manufactured product, plaintiff's labor and investment in their produc2

tion, rthe purrJhase in fee of the drainage 'aTea rof Dixml

1

Gulch within which to deposit them, the law as we conceive it to be when applied to such a product and our
use of the natural (lhannel or creek bed of Dixon Gul<:lh
for the conveyancl'l of that product to our intake for
these and other jsi,milar solutions elsewhere produced
then being com;ey,eq:to plaintiff's precipitating plants
for the second stage

qf their

treat~ent,

the filing with

the State Engineer before the creation of the Dixon
Gulch dumps of

a~.

application to_ appropriate the cop-

per solutions thereafter to be produced, wherein the
point of diversion was fixed at the Hays Spring, lest
the solutions to be produced be held waters of a character whereof the State Engineer might have jurisdiction,-all these a'spects of -1:!hi:s suiit 1;nd' po~nts in the
argument, and more, have been exhaustively discussed
in the briefs and in oral argument.

But there is at

least one that in the course of all this argument counsel
have been content to pass with the least possi'ble reference,-we suspect rin the hope that 1it would not be emphasized. The point to which we refer is the following:

"V.

POINT:

''A liquid or artificial increment artificially
produced and added to a natural stream or introduced into a natural channel, by the labor of man
without intent to abandon, belongs to the man
whose labor produced it or brought it there when
na:turrally it would nort have existed there. Such
liquid increment may be taken out of the natural
3

stream or channel by its owner and may be recaptured and reclaimed by him at sueh ;point on
the natural channel as may best serve the owner's purpose. Water Rights in the Western
States, 3d Ed. Wiel, Vol. 1, p. 38."

If all the rest of our contentions are to be ruled against
us, and now we a.re to be gov,erned by the ·1aw of waters,
then we confidently assert the point last mentioned has
not been and cannot be answered.
Inasmuch as this court held in Utah Copper Co. vs.
Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., et al, 69
Utah, at page 430-431, as follows:
'"~*"" the waters carrying copper or other
minerals in solution, so long as they are in the
dump and thus a part of it, *** are, like the
du,mp itself, the property of the plaintiff; that
it is as lawful for the plaintiff, so long as the
waters are in the dump, to coiled and remove
them as it is to remove the dump itself; ***"

applying by analogy the law of waters, counsel contend
that the dump is as a spring in plaintiff's land, the
water whereof wiU be plaintiff's property while within
plaintiff's land.

Carrying the conception further, no

other conclusion can be indulged than that the waters
from this spring, when leaving the Sipring, flow down
a natural water course in a channel that is known and
defined, and that plaintiff, in addition to its ownership
while upon and within its land, filed upon those waters
as waters of a natural stream flowing in a natural
water course or channel known and defined, and there4

in designated its point of diversion at the Hays Spring.
Concluding the analogy and supplementing the fact that
plaintiff is the owner of the water while on or in plaintiff's land, plaintiff filed upon it below, where it constitutes the water of a natural stream, the Bingham &
Garfield Railway Company having acquired the ancient
rights to the stream before the creation of plaintiff's
dumps or ''works for the reduction of ores;'' and supplementing all those facts, we conclude the analogy by
due recognition of the fact that defendants have not
now and never had any right whatever to or interest
in those waters as waters of a natural stream, never
had any use for them as waters at all, and admittedly
never wanted them. ''It is the copper only in the water
that they seek."

(Finding XVII, Tr. 4057, Abs. 612.)

This court must conclude that the water as it leaves
plaintiff's dump flows down Dixon Gulch as a natural
stream in a natural water course along a natural channel that is known and defined, because the court below
so found a:nd this court adopted that finding in the face
of error assigned by defendants, and .again we rep~at
the finding below which this court has adopted :
(XXX, Tr. 4063, Abs. 620):
"Now and at all times with which this cause
is concerned the railroad fill, including the westedy slope thereof, is and had been porous and
has at all said times amd does now freely .admit
the passage of water and solutions from plain5

tiff's dumps above. The westerly slope of that
fill has not been sealed.''
to which defendants assigned error. (Assignment No.
20, Abs. 705).

(XXXII, Tr. 4064, Abs. 620):
"The average grade of Dixon Gulch is about
26°. The copper waters or solutions flowing at
the so-called Hays Spring flow through and out
of the railroad fill through, at or near the rock
wall, but they do not flow from the sulphide vein
and on the contrary are waters merely that have
come to and into the railroad fill from and
through plaint,iff 's dumps in Dixon Gulch above
the railroad fill, have flowed and percolated
down into and laterally through the railroad fill,
have flowed down the bottom of Dixon Gulch on
bedrock or on and through surface soil in the
bottom of Dixon Gulch and emerged from the
downhill slope and near the toe of the railroad
fill in the bottom of Dixon Gulch. The course so
pursued by said waters is definitely known and
positively defrned, said course being Dixon Gulch
down to, throug•h and aeross rrract D and tlte
whole thm·eof and ·a•bove ·bedrock. ** * " (Ita lies
ours).
to which defendants assigned error (Assignment No. 22,
Abs. 707).

But ·in disposing of these assignments, this

court properly held by its majority opinion that this
being a law action, it was bound by the findings.

The

court below, having found that these waters flow in a
known and defined channel, a natural stream, and this
court having adopted that finding, we are not i,nsulting
this court, nor are we disrespectful, nor are we guilty
6

of conduct that is at all censurable, nor are we doing
anything but what our duty requires us to do when we
assert earnestly and emphatically that no court ca.n
rightly hold these copper solutions percolating waters
title to which is in the defendants because this natural
stream or .water course, this known and defined natural
channel, traverses a part of defendants' land! A court
may not rightly find waters those of a natural stream
and then decree title thereto in the owner of the land
t~aversed by the stream, the latter on the theory that
.suc'h waters arc not the wwtcrs of a natnral•stf'e>am, but
instead percolating waters! Such is the situation 1n
which the major•ity opinion places this court.
The dictionary definition of "percolate'' 1s "to
Rtrain through; to pass or cause to pass through small
interstices as a liquor; filter: literally and figuratively." (Century) The Century definition of "seep" is
''to (joze or .percolate gently; flow gently m drippingly
through pores; trickle." Subterranean waters that
neither seep nor percolate within those definitions
Wlould indeed be rare. That subte:rr.ane<an waters both
seep and percolate within those def.ini·tions is assumed
when classifying them. Waters that percolate a•re of
course very frequently not percolating water within
certain legal definitions of such. Subterranean wa·ters
seeping, flowing or percolating in defined and klllown
channels may be percolating waters within the dictionary definition of such, but they certainly are not per7

colating waters within the legal definition.

Kinney on

Irrigation and \Vater Rights, :2d Ed. Vol. :2, Ch. 6:2, p.
:2149, § 1185 et seq.

Likewise, of course, it is true that

su bterranean waters that

flow

1

may

be percolating

It is not importm1t
that such waters seep, flow or percolate, but it is all
important that they do or do not seep, percolate or flow
along channels or courses that are known or defined,
knowledge of course or channel being the classifying
tcritenion. 67 C. J. 836. 'Dhere .is nothing e.ither
new <or startHng in this statement, this court like
all others having frequently so held. Cres·cent Mining
Co. v. Silver King Mining Co., (1898) 17 Utah 444, 70
Am. St. Rep. 810, 54 Pac. 244; Herriman Irr. Co. v.
Keel (1902), 25 Utah 96, 69 Pac. 719. In the case at
bar the channel is well-krnown and defined. The court
below so found, by which finding this court very properly confesses itself bound, and hence these waters cannot be held percolating waters within the legal definition the majority opinion has wrongly applied. As held
in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585,
the waters of a subterranean stream are uot changed
into percol:at1ing waters merely because the known and
defined channel of the stream is filled to a considerable
extent by boulders, sand, gravel and other porous
materi'al, through w1hich the waters of the stream f•lmv.
55 A. L. R. 1389. This ease was discussed in respondent's brief at pages 80 to 84.
waters within the legal definition.

8

We call the court's attention to the following from
the majority opinion in the case at bar:

"**'* Nor do we see how it . can help the
plaintiff's case to say that the waters or solutions follo.w a known and defined oourse in passin!{ from plaintiff's land across Tract D to the
intake on Tract C, the known and defined course
bwng Dixon Gulch. *'** There is no stream
flowing in that gulch either upon or beneath the
surfa'ce. The waters do not move with a current,
as flowirig waters do, but in the manner usually
referred to as by seeping and percolating; except the so-called Hayes Spring waters, where
they issue out of the toe of the fill, and the drain
tunnel waters with which we are not concerned.
This is so manifest that counsel for plaintiff frequently use those very words in describing the
manner of progression of the waters across
Tract D. Therefore, the law pertaining to the
right to the use of water flowing in streams does
not apply to this situation; rund so it can make
no difference that the waters find their way
across Tract D from the west toward the east
and between the walls of Dixon Gulch.''
We respectfully sutbmit that therein the court mils-s't'a,tes
the law in this, that the .channel's 'being a natural stre~am
channel that is known and defined, it would make no
difference were there at times no stream naturally flowing along its course, (in addition to the citations heretofore made, see 67 C. J. 1047, Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Gal.
46) and m:is-1states the fact in this, that there is now and
always has been a natural stream flowing in that gulch
constantly throughout the year, the source of which has
9

always been N1e natural

sprin~s

at the hc:ad of the gulch,

now augmented by the copper solutions from plaintiff's
dumps, and 'aga1in mis-states the fact in this, that the
waters flow with a very decided eurrent d'Own a 26° grade,
,and ag1ain mis-states the law in this, that whether or not
we deserihed in our brief's this :flow 'as ''seeping and pereolating" i,s, we most respectfully submit, of no interest
or :importance whatev:er, the channel or course of ·such
seepage or percolation being known and defined.

Also,

the majority oprnion makes an exception of the Hays
Spring waters, but actually and under the findings of
fact by the court below, adopted by this court, there ar·e
no other waters here involved, the drain tunnel waters
confessedly having been eliminated from this case.
Surely the court misconstrued or overlooked the
facts and those expressly found below and adopted here
to have arrived at such a conclusion.

The differenee

it makes is that in this jurisdidion the owner of the
land traYersed by the natural water course or stream
bed can have no right, title or interest in the waters
seeping, percol>ating or flowing therein, merely by reason
of his ownership of the land. But in the excerpt quoted
above from the majority opinion, the court refers to the
"progression of the watm·s aer:oss 'rract D,'' and "that
the waters find their way across Tract D from the
we,st toward the east and between the walls of Dixon
Gulch." vVe respectfully submit that by that definition
the majority of this court by its opinion have remowd

10

these waters or solutions from the realm of percolating
waters within the legal definition and have themselves
in contmdi.ction of their conclusion defined them as
waters flowing in a course that is kntown and defined,
waters wherein the mere land owner can have no night,
title, interest or claim.
As long ago as Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Gal. 46, it was
held by the supreme court of California that a ditcih
company might use the natunaJl channel of the st~ream
as a part of its ditch system without danger of abamdonment of i·ts water or its right to divert that water below
out of the natural channel, the court saying:
"It would be a harsh rule ** to require those
engaged in these enterprise.s to construct an
•actual ditch along the whole route through which
the waters were carried, and to refuse them the
economy that nature occasionally afforded in the
shape of a dry ravine, gulch, or canon. ***"
and the supreme court reversed the trial court which
had enjoined such diversi!on, the theory of the trial
court being that once the water had been allowed to
le1ave the possession of the ditch company and flow into
and down the natuml channel, 1:1he ditch ·company ha!J
abandoned it whatever might have been the dit'Ch company's intention with relati'on to its diveTsion from the
e1·eek channe•l below. The supreme court held there was
no abandonment, because the ditch company intended
11

to take its water out below.

So far as we are aware,

there has been unti,l now no derparture from that rule.
Moreover, it seems to us that no one should lose
sight of the fact we have asserted so often that these
defendants are not interested in the waters, that

011

the

contrary t,heir sole interest is in the copper which 1s
wholly plaintiff's contribution and to the production of
which defendants have contributed nothing, and never
intend bo, and never will, contribute anything, copper
that is the result solely of plaintiff's industry and investment.

The water is a mere instrumentality for the

conveyance of plaintiff's copper to plaintiff's precipitating plant, and in conveying that copper the court
below found, and thi,s court has adopted the finding,
that plaintiff has availed itself of the natural stream or
water course of Dixon Gulch, and that its waters so
transp'orting its copper use and follow that natural
channel or water course, which is both kno,wn and defined.
Is it any wonder that wo protest so emphatically
the proposed seizure by defendants of this copper in
the course of its transportation along this natural water
course as a part of a natural stream, to plaintiff's
facilities 1 \Ve are s,incerely of the opinion that there
is no law and no analogy that will permit its seizure;
that the present opinion of the majol"ity of this court
stands alone in judicial decisions, an anomarly without

12

precedent to support it and wholly inconsistent within
itself.

rro upholu defendants' eontentJion that they may

seize this copper as so transported in this natural
stream, the bed of which traverses a part of defendant's
property, 'is io grant defendants the right to avail themselves of the fruits of the capital and labor of the plaintiff without Clompensation to the plaintiff and without
plaintiff's .consent and against plaintiff's will-a doctrrine too monstrous and absurd to be sanctioned by
judicial authority.

Hoffman vs. Stone, 7 Oalif. 46.

It is a fundamental principle of the law that its
rules must be "calculated to secure persons in their
pi'Operty and possessiorns, and to preserve for them
the fruits of their labors and expenditures."

Katz v.
1
Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116; 70 Pac. 663; 74 P ac. 766;
99 A.S.R. 35. The majmi·ty opinion of this court ignores
that fundamental principle. In a;ll this debate it has not
been de1nied, nor can it be denied, upon the record:
1.

rrhat while plaintiff's contribution in the future

will quite likely be both water and c1opper, its present
f•:ontribution to the so-called "waters" of Dixon Gulch
is the copper in SO'lutim1, artificially produced by plaintiff, the intentional result of plaintiff's labor and investment, constituting a regular and legitimate phase
of the mining, milling and metallurgical operations
plaintiff was organized to carry on.
·>

That this copper in s1olution, pl•aintiff's contri13

butiOIIl solely, is desired by these defendants, t'o the creation of which defendants have contri:buted nothing, will
not •and never have intended to, contrrbute anything.
3.

That in the course of plruintiff's operations

plaiintiff pmposed to utiilize the natural stream channel
or creek bed in Dixon Gulch for the trnnspor1Jation of
this copper in su1lution, so produced hy plaintiff, to plaintiff's diversion farcilit'ies situated in the natural stream
bed upon Tract C, where are collected also plaintiff's
similar copper solutions flowing through plaintiff's
lines coming from the south, and as well the solutions
from the drain tunnel in Dixun Gulch.
4.

That because this natural stream bed trav·erses

a part of defendants' property, and by reason of that
fact only, the defendants claim that the defendants acquired title to such copper solutions while fol1owing this
natural channel down Dixon Gulch to plraintiff's intake.
5.

But it is a s1ound and universrally recognized

rule of law that:
"A liquid or artificial increment ar.tificially
produced and added to a natural stream or introduced into a natural channel, by the labor of
man without intent to abandon, belongs to the
man whiose labor produced it or brought it there
when naturally it would not have ex!isted there.
1Such liquid increment may be taken out of the
natural stream or channel by its owner and may
be recaptured and reclraimed by him, at such
point on the natul"al channel as may best serve
14

the owner's purpose. Water Rights in the vVestern States, 3d Ed. Wiel, Vol. 1, p. 38. ''
6.

And it is a fundamenta;l principle of law t'hat

its rules must be calculated to secure persons in their
pi"operty a:nd pos:sessions and to preserve for them the
fruits of their labors and expenditures.
Upon that re,cord, whether or not the majority of
this court may agree with the other grounds urged by
us in support of our acti10n, we respectfully sUibmit that
a revers:al of the judgment below is impossible.

Were

we w:itJhout respect for thi's court, we would not 'be making here the effort now made to procure the withdrawal
,of this majnrity

opin~on,

and we have no hesitancy in

declaring here, manifesting thereby all due respect to
this eourt without in:sult to amyone, that the major:ity
opinion can result only in a gross miscarriage of justice
if it be .allowed t'o ripen into the final judgment of this
eJourt.

Such a judgment upon this reemd in this suit

ul1Cier the pleadings by which we are bound would be a
denial of due process to thh; plaintiff in violati:on of
the F'ederal eonstitution as heretofore stated, and likewise a denial to this plaintiff of the equal pr:otection of
the l,aws.
How absurd it is now for counsel to assert that
the affirmative defens,e pleaded by defendants in their
answers is a counterclaim! At the very commencement
of the trial, when Judge Ritchie was endeavoring to

15

inf.orm himself concerning the pleadings and the issues
to be tried, we were asked if we had filed a reply to the
defendants' answers, to which question we replied we
had not, that there was no matter pleaded that required
a reply, that we stood upon the

den~al

afforded by the

:statute under such circumstances; and in the course of
t'hat disoussion, M.r. Parsons turned to Mr. Badger and
asked him if he CJonst,rued his pleading as a counterclaim, and Mr. Badger's answer w:as that he did not.
That discussion apparently wa-s not tralllscribed by the
report,er, and its occurrence must rest upon the reGollecti:on of counsel. Had they regarded the answer as
setting up a counterclaim, why did they not t~ake judgment upon their
i~s

~ounterc1aim

by default 1 The answer

in all respeJcts similar in form to that in any con-

demnation suit; it contaillls affirmative alleg1ations with
relation to damages as answers in such suits always do;
hut there 'is no eounterc1aim.
It was never OUT contention that if the copper solutions, for the transportation of which plaintiff seeks to
oondemn an ea!sement, originated in defendants' lands
as atleged by the defendants, that plaintiff could condemn them, and a~ordingly plaintiff did not attempt
to condemn them. It

wa~s

also true that if the solutions

were of the origin defendants contended f.or them, and
therefore plaintiff would not own them, then there
would 1be no occasion for plaintiff's acqui,sition of an
easement for t:heir

t~ransportation,

16

and there would ac-

eordingly be no reas,on for the suit.

However, plain-

triff eontemled that the only copper solutions it sought
to transport over the easement to be condemned were
those plaintiff had produced in its dumps

abov~e

in

Dixon Gul0h, of which plaintiff was the owner, that all
partie~s

oonceded to plaintiff ownership of the watefls

in plaintiff's dumps; that all the solutions so to be
transported by plaintiff came from

thes~e

dumps in

Uixon Gule:h, washed out of the dumps by waters falling or placed thereupon, joining the natural creek flow
from the springs aJbove and continuing t:heir course
down the gulch in the natural creek channel acros'S the
easement condemned to

p~aintiff'is

intake on Tract C-

so the Lower court found, aud this court declares itself
hound by that finding.

Hav1ing held th:at plaintiff is

ex,presiSly within the statute ''S provisions conferring the
rig'ht of e:rruinent domain, we insist th:at, having £ound
botth £ads and law for the plaintiff, judgment heflein
('an not be rightly revensed.
Res.pedfully submitted,

DICKSON, ELLIS, PARSONS
& McCREA,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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